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War in the Hazarajat:  Imposed Identities and Flawed Schemes of State Building 
 
The existence of a “Hazarajat,” that is, a meaningfully bounded cultural region in the 
heart of Afghanistan populated by a group distinct from the broadly Pashtun-Persianate ethnic 
milieu of surrounding areas, generated and continues to generate maladaptive tensions within 
Afghanistan.  The formation of a modern Afghan state necessitated the forceful integration of the 
Hazara within Kabul’s political sphere in order to maintain political coherence in the context of 
both internal and external imperial pressure, in terms of both regional Afghan-British tensions 
and local moves to reinforce state power emanating from the capital.  Forceful integration 
efforts, and specifically the 1888-1894 war conducted by Abd al-Rahman, furthered the 
coalescence of a discrete Afghan entity yet concomitantly introduced somewhat of a poisoned 
chalice into Afghan nationhood:  a land and people significant in size and distinct from the 
majority, yet possessing territorial centrality.  At the intersection of counterproductive Afghan 
state building, tenuous tribal politics, and traditional notions of regional self-governance stands 
the war in the Hazarajat and the lingering tensions it produced.   
 
A People Apart 
The Hazara, on the face of things, stand apart from other major ethnic groups in 
Afghanistan.  They sit outside the Indo-Aryan racial continuum in south-central Asia, being 
characterized as Asiatic in appearance, with the majority being practitioners of Shia Islam, a 
minority belief system in a country mostly populated by Sunnis of various backgrounds.  Their 
origin can be approximated but is not definitively known.  Modern scholarly consensus traces 
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their ancestry back to an intermixing between Mongol/Turkic and autochthonic populations, 
emerging as a distinct group during and after the Mongol invasions of the 1200s and 1300s CE.1 
There are dissenting scholarly opinions on this question, some speculate pre-Mongol Turkic 
origins, while other academics claim that the Hazara descend from entirely indigenous or entirely 
Mongol historical populations.2  
 
In whichever case, what is clear is that the Hazara have become a distinct and meaningful 
grouping in the context of Afghan ethnography and ethnopolitical history.  This group can be 
described as Shia Muslim, Dari-speaking (specifically, a Turkic-informed dialect of Dari called 
Hazaragi), sedentary, and inhabiting the modern Afghan provinces of Ghor, Daykundi, Bamiyan, 
Ghazni, Uruzgan, Samian, Wardak, and Baghlan to greater and lesser extents.3  Within these 
central Hazara territories of Afghanistan, the local majorities often cohabitated with minorities of 
other ethnicities:  Pashtuns in the south, Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north, and Aimaqs to the west.  
What this paper and others refer to as “the definitive Hazarajat” is a meaningfully Hazara region, 
but it is not exclusively inhabited by its namesake people.  Further, in a more contemporary 
context, there are significant populations of Hazaras in major Afghan cities, functioning in both 
discrete Hazara urban communities and as a class of subaltern workers in non-Hazara 
households.4 
 
1 Elizabeth Bacon, “The Inquiry into the History of the Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan,” Southwestern Journal of 
Anthropology 7, no. 3 (September 1, 1951), p. 241. 
2 Sayed Askar Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan:  an Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study.  
Curzon (1998), pp. 19-43. 
3 Alessandro Monsutti, “Hazara History”, Encyclopedia Iranica XII, no. 1 (2003), p. 83. 
4 Melissa Kerr Chiovenda, “The Illumination of Marginality”, Central Asian Survey 33, no. 4 (February 2014), pp. 
453-54. 
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It is vital to disentangle Hazara identity from this paper’s use of Hazara as an academic exonym.  
With regards to most of this paper’s descriptive and analytic content, “Hazara” is used as above:  
it refers to a Dari-speaking people of significant Mongol/Central Asian descent living in 
agriculturalist villages in the central highlands of Afghanistan, practicing Shia Islam.  However, 
such an identity does not fully encapsulate the people who identify as Hazara, who carry on a 
variety of urban and rural existences across the country of focus and beyond.  There exist 
significant communities of Hazara in the cities of Ghazni, Herat, and Kabul, as well as in the city 
of Quetta in southern Pakistan.5  Those communities were extant during the time period 
examined by this paper, but their growth and coming-of-age occurred because of, and thus after 
the 1888-1894 war this paper investigates. 
 
Conversely, there are communities historically and geographically grouped with the Hazara who 
practice Sunni Islam, and a similar ethnic grouping called the Aimaq, who live in western 
Afghanistan, are traditionally nomadic pastoralists, practice Sunni Islam, but have emerged out 
of the same historical phenomena (Mongol migration and local acculturation) which produced 
the Hazara.6  This paper focuses its attention on definitive members of the Hazara ethnicity 
dwelling in central Afghanistan, but will also touch on these complexifying relations.   
 
 
5 Mousavi, pp. 139-153. 
6 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, “Shift and Drift in Hazara Ethnic Consciousness:  The Impact of Conflict and Migration.” 
Crossroads Asia Working Paper Series (September 27, 2012), pp. 4-5. 
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Finally, it is essential to pick apart not only what the definitively material and physical aspects of 
the Hazara identity are and how they came to be, but how also those aspects became entrenched 
in exonomic versus endonomic paradigms of identity.  It must be recognized that “entanglements 
of identity”7 in the modern context, the strong conceptual ethno-social linkages between Hazara 
servitude, racial alien-ness, and Shia modes of religious devotion, are states of affairs with 
discrete and identifiable exonomic origins; that is, identification of the Hazara as a Mongoloid-
presenting Shia underclass was first done, and done most forcefully, by outsiders.8  
Internalization of these features by the Hazara themselves as either intrinsic or inescapable 
aspects of their endonomy, that is, their self-identity and modes of self-reference, came in large 
part due to (and thus, after) the events that this paper focuses on.  In short, a potent mix of 
internal imperialism; Islamization in a Sunni, state-directed context; and Abd al-Rahman’s 
interfacing with Pashtun tribal interests; would serve to “activate” these exonomies of identity 
for the Hazara9 for the 20th century.  Premodern and localized modes of Hazara endonomic 
identity would be displaced parallel to their own geographic displacement after 1894.10   
 
The first recorded mention of a “Hazara” people comes from the writings of the Central Asian 
conqueror Babur in the 16th century, who ascribed the term to a variety of groups and places in 
central Afghanistan.  His “Hazara,” which is not fully disentangled from the nomadic “Aimaq,” 
appear at least partially Mongol in descent, and some spoke a Turco-Mongol language.11  When 
 
7 Farzana Marie, “Confronting Misconstrued Histories:  Creative Strategies in the Hazara Struggle toward Identity 
and Healing,” Arizona Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 2, no. 1 (Spring 2013), p. 87. 
8 Ibrahimi, pp. 1-2. 
9 Chiovendra, p. 4. 
10 Monsutti, War and Migration, pp. 62-63. 
11 Monsutti, History, p. 82. 
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the Hazara acculturated to a totally Persianate linguistic existence is not known, but that was the 
case at least as early as the mid-19th century CE.  Such a growth in affinity for Dari-Persian 
culture may have come about under the Hazara’s conversion to Shia Islam in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, during Safavid Persian rule.12   
 
Hazara lifeways in the period this paper addresses were different, though not significantly so, 
from the Afghan median.  The Hazara were in broad terms agriculturalists, with a secondary 
mode of economic production tied to sedentary, village-based cattle grazing and herding.13  In 
this sense, they lacked the nomadic, specifically pastoral orientation of the southern Durrani 
Pashtun, and also were without the more “developed” modes of sedentary, urbanized living 
prominent among the Ghilzai Pashtun of Afghanistan’s east.14  What nomadism did exist in the 
Hazarajat was predominantly local and trade caravan-based, fulfilling the need for commercial 
linkages between thinly settled valleys lacking safe and high volume road networks.15   
 
The broader context of Hazara economic and social patterns derives from the relation between 
mutually reinforcing structures of cultural differentiation and topographic isolation.  As a 
heterodox religious sect residing predominantly in an isolated mountain system in a region 
broadly lacking consistent functions of state authority, relations to outside groups and locales 
were greatly lessened relative to Pashtun and Tajik communities in the “outer bounds” of 
 
12 Mousavi, p. 204. 
13 Klaus Ferdinand, “Nomad Expansion & Commerce in Central Afghanistan:  A Sketch of Some Modern Trends,” 
Folk 4 (1961), p. 126. 
14 Ibid., p. 124. 
15 Ibid., p. 125. 
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Afghanistan.16  Those other major ethnic communities of Afghanistan possessed strong links to 
their co-ethnics in surrounding polities,17 engendering a degree of regional connectivity that the 
Hazara, due to their cultural peculiarities, simply lacked.  Afghan Pashtuns maintained strong 
tribal and economic links across the Hindu Kush into the northwest frontier of British India, 
while the Tajiks were generally conceived as forming the northeastern boundary of a Persianate 
cultural continuum extending from Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf into Central Asia.18  What 
would otherwise have been a meaningful linguistic and religious link to Iran was negated by the 
significant difficulty of merely accessing Hazara territory.   
 
Through-trade in Hazarajat was minimal.  The east-west and north-south caravan routes were 
routed along Herat-Qandahar or Herat-Mazar-e Sharif-Kabul paths (in the case of the former), or 
Mazar-e Sharif-Kabul-Qandahar (in the latter case).19  Highly variable topography and heavy 
snowfall reduced the utility of routes through the center of Afghanistan, which is to say, through 
Hazara territory.20  Both the Hazara and the nature of their “native” terrain posed extensive 
threats to caravan traders, with the former characterized by Abd al-Rahman as raiders and 
plunderers of caravans in his justification for war upon the ethnic group.21  Whether Abd al-
Rahman’s notions of Hazara banditry were true is unclear and not within the focus of the paper, 
but it is clear that the Hazarajat lacked the relative connectivity and ease of movement that 
 
16 Mousavi, pp. 57-60; Dupree, pp. 5-21. 
17 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan.  Princeton University Press (1980), pp.  57-61. 
18 Ibid., pp. 319-321. 
19 Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, Connecting Histories in Afghanistan:  Market Relations and State Formation on a 
Colonial Frontier.  Stanford University Press (2011), pp. 6-8, 51-58. 
20 Monsutti, War and Migration, p. 59. 
21 Ferdinand, p. 126. 
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outlying regions of Afghanistan possessed.  As such, Hazara territory was characteristically 
insular in cultural terms, as well as a lacuna of commercial activity.   
 
The Hazara’s relation to state power in this period is not well-known.  Regional secular 
governance flowed from tribal leaders, the mir, to subtribal local leaders called beg.  Also 
important in local affairs were the sayyed or sayyid, descendants of the Islamic Prophet 
Mohammed who held some measure of authority as local notables.22  The sayyeds, who 
commanded respect and authority due to non-tribal bloodlines, lived and operated beside but not 
directly within tribal hierarchies led by mirs.  Thirdly, networks of educated religious leaders, 
trained in Iranian and Iraqi madrassas or religious schools, exercised their own temporal 
authority parallel to the tribal hierarchies of the mir and beg.23  This last category of authority, 
though perennially present, gained prominence only in the later 20th century with the penetration 
of foreign influence into the region and the activation of conscious Shiism as a primary mode of 
Hazara identity.  As such, explicitly religious Hazara leadership will not be addressed in a 
significant way by this paper.   
 
For the most part, during the early- and mid-19th century, outside influence in the Hazarajat was 
characterized by intertribal conflicts brought to the region via Hazara disputes with other 
regional/local Tajik and Uzbek tribal authorities.  These networks of tribal leaders and sayyeds 
exercised broad authority within the Hazarajat, and only during the reign of Dost Mohammed in 
the mid-19th century did the modern Afghan state first penetrate “intrusively” into traditional 
 
22 Ibrahimi, p. 3. 
23 Ibid.  
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Hazara lands.24  Hazara mirs paid taxes to central authority in Kabul as early as the rule of Sher 
Ali Khan in the 1860s.25  Some Hazara tribes supported Sher Ali in his unsuccessful fight to 
defend the throne from Abd al-Rahman after his return from Bukhara in 1880, but most quickly 
realigned behind the victor.  When Abd al-Rahman cemented his control of Kabul and began a 
reciprocal relationship with the British that focused on funding to centralize and solidify control 
of his realm, the past disloyal and insurrectionary nature of the Hazara, along with their 
heterodox religious practices, were portrayed as grave issues.26  This is to say that the Hazara 
were generally not in direct and open opposition to Kabul at the conflict’s beginning.  
Indeed,many Hazara mirs, particularly in the north of Hazarajat, accepted the sovereignty of Abd 
al-Rahman and paid taxes to his regime.  Rather, early hostilities emerged from state overreach, 
not latent Hazara insurrectionary tendencies.27 
 
The Conflict’s Stage 
There is little scholarly consensus on the exact origins of the 1888-1894 conflict in the 
Hazarajat, but the scholarship of Hazara academic Sayed Askar Mousavi tends to attribute 
causality to Hazara leadership’s reactions to the structural instability and capriciousness of the 
Afghan state.  Incessant conflict between tribal leaders, and more broadly between ethnic groups 
during this time, as well as increased state tax collection and newly harshened disciplinary 
measures utilized by Abd al-Rahman to assert control of the country, all incentivized Hazara 
tribes to dissociate first in terms of non-compliance, and then violence, from the structures that 
 
24 Mousavi, pp. 92-94. 
25 Ferdinand, p. 128. 
26 Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
27 Mousavi, pp. 119-121. 
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bound the Hazarajat to the Kabul regime.28  Hazara mirs who had enjoyed amenable 
arrangements with Abd al-Rahman early in his reign, as well as under his predecessor, 
increasingly found themselves subject to harsh taxes and territorial dispossession.  Early 
resistance to such measures led to mass incarcerations of mirs and begs identified by state 
authorities as instigators of insurrection, though nothing as such had occurred at that time.  It was 
one such action, the arrest and exile of the Hazara tribal leader Sayed Jafar to Mazar-e Sharif in 
northern Afghanistan, that would provoke the ethnic group into widespread open rebellion.29   
 
Time must be taken here to make sense of the Afghan state’s motivations in utilizing heavy-
handed measures against a people who were not especially restive or rebellious in the first place.  
Contemporary and historical scholarship provides two mutually reinforcing points central to the 
argument of this paper:  the Kabul state’s concern for state building, border erection, and internal 
imperialism; and the Durrani monarchy’s equally vital interest in manipulating domestic tribal 
dynamics to preserve the dynastic security of the regime.  On the first point, Abd al-Rahman’s 
reign began the most intense period of internally led domestic state building on the Western 
model to date in Afghanistan.30  Prompted and supported by British imperial interests, the 
monarchy undertook a program of administrative reform and expenditure restructuring that 
elevated the establishment and enforcement of borders, forts, and a standing military into 
positions of vital state interest.31  Such a project required a concomitant expansion of state 
authority to and across internal and external borders.32  The Hazarajat was one such area, 
 
28 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
29 Ibid., p. 121. 
30 Dupree, pp. 415-420. 
31 Hanifi, Connecting Histories, pp. 100-103, 119-120. 
32 Ibrahimi, p. 5. 
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possibly the most prominent within Afghanistan, where traditional means of exercising state 
power necessitated a negotiated process of devolution-of-authority to indigenous tribal leaders.33  
The Kabuli state could not lean on its blood ties to the Pashtun ethnic plurality of its territory to 
exercise control here, and nor could it write off the Hazarajat as just another frontier zone to be 
eventually brought under state control.  As an internal frontier, continued toleration of the 
Hazarajat’s foreignness served only to dislocate the settled core of the monarchy’s realm in 
Kabul, Ghazni, and Qandahar from the vital commercial centers of Herat and Mazar-e Sharif.   
 
Hazara Mirs and begs were traditionally expected to pay their accumulated tax revenue forward 
to the central government, and in return, they would be left with major authority on regional and 
local issues.  Such an arrangement was inimical to Abd al-Rahman’s state-building project, and 
when combined with the decided “otherness” of the Hazara (Shia, non-Pashtun in language and 
appearance, and their relative isolation in the central highlands) allowed for state perspectives 
which problematized the Hazarajat as an obstruction to Afghan administrative and territorial 
integrity, irrespective of their general lack of insurrectionary interest.   
 
The second, related motive in the Durrani monarchy’s plan to subjugate the Hazarajat was the 
extensive potential such a subjugation would have for rebalancing domestic, and specifically 
Pashtun, tribal relations.  The Kabul state’s ability to exercise authority in the “heartlands” of 
eastern and southern Afghanistan relied on the strategic manipulation of Pashtun tribal interests 
to ensure the security of regime interests.34  According to academics who disagree with Dupree 
 
33 Mousavi, p. 121. 
34 Dupree, pp. 418-419. 
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on this question, the Afghan state was not a Pashtun state.35  Indeed, its core administrative 
apparatus was definitively Persianate.  However, the relation of the state to Pashtun tribal 
movements and interests remained absolutely central to its function as an instrument of authority 
for its rulers.  Further, Pashtun and other Afghan tribal interests emerged out of a premodern, 
preindustrial context which valued land rights over capital processes, making local and regional 
negotiations of authority inexorably linked to the question of territory.36   
 
The phenomenon of resettling Pashtun communities by force and/or by incentive had precedents 
in Abd al-Rahman’s government.  He had done so with thousands of Ghilzai Pashtun in the 
northeastern Hindu Kush, the Ghilzai being characterized in most academic literature as 
generally in opposition to the Durrani Pashtun base of support for his regime.37  By removing 
them from the strategically valuable, majority Pashtun territories in southeastern Afghanistan and 
placing them in locales with indigenous non-Pashtun populations, Abd al-Rahman sought to 
remove them from the immediacy of intra-Pashtun conflict and resettle them among people less 
tied to the Pashtun-Kabul axis of power.  Further, such a transfer of Pashtuns from the center to 
the fringes allowed a concomitant spread of that Pashtun-Kabul axis’ utility in national and tribal 
politics.  What occurred in Hazarajat would, initially, run along similar lines.   
 
The Kabuli State and Minorities 
 
35 Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, “Quandaries of the Afghan Nation,” in Shahazad Bashir and Robert D. Crews (eds.), in 
Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands (Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 
99-100. 
36 Mousavi, pp. 123-125. 
37 Dupree, p. 419. 
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The Hazara are not the only, or possibly even the most historically significant, Shia-
identified minority within the Afghanistan of Abd al-Rahman.  Standing in stark contrast to the 
Hazara in nearly every aspect but their declared religious affiliation were the Qizilbash, a 
Persianized Turkic minority prominent in the urban communities of Kabul and Qandahar.38  This 
group became progressively more closely affiliated with the Afghan state through their dual 
utilization as a “loyalist fifth column” and as literate (in Persian) administrators by the Durrani 
monarchy from the mid-1700s to the period of focus for this paper and beyond.39  Though broad 
anti-Shia strictures were issued by Abd al-Rahman as part of his Islamization campaigns, the 
Qizilbash were by that point so integrated into, and such an integral part of, the Afghan state 
structure that nominal displays of taqiyya or public displays of majoritarian religious adherence 
were enough to guarantee their safety.  At the time of this paper, the Qizilbash were decidedly 
“on the side of” Abd al-Rahman, and not their co-religionists.40  Their nature as willing and 
critical participants in Afghan state formation made forceful normalization of Sunni practices 
both unnecessary and unadvisable.  Further, their specific geographic distribution within urban 
centers untied them from centrifugal arrangements of power in the tribal hinterlands so 
commonly discussed within conventional Afghan histories.  Lacking either urbanization or 
institutional power within the state, the Hazara could not help but become a target for forceful 
incorporation.   
 
 
38 Dupree, p. 334. 
39 Solaiman Fazel, “Ethnohistory of the Qizilbash in Kabul:  Migration, State, and a Shia Minority,” (Ph.D Thesis, 
Indiana University, 2017), pp. 5-6 
40 Mohammed Hasan Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan:  The Reign of Amir ʼAbd Al-Rahman Khan.  
University of Texas Press (1979), p. 99. 
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As another brief point of comparison, the position of the inhabitants of Nuristan or Kafiristan 
must be explicated to obtain a fuller sense of the situation that the Hazara found themselves in at 
the close of the 19th century.  Similar to the Hazara, the Kafiristanis (a derogatory appellation 
given to this people before their Islamization under Abd al-Rahman) maintained a relatively 
isolated existence in a series of narrow valleys on the periphery of more settled lands.41  Further, 
that geographic or topographic solitude allowed for the maintenance of heterodox or even 
foreign (to the macro-regional Muslim majority) religious and cultural practices.  As indicated by 
the appellation of kafir, inhabitants of what would become Nuristan traditionally practiced a 
polytheistic model of religion42 related to Indo-European pantheons familiar to students of 
Western and South Asian history.43  As such, the Kafiristanis lived under a form of tribalism 
little informed by either Islamic cultural practices or regional dynamics.  Though the specific 
nature of their “otherness” differed from the Hazara in terms of degree, that they were “other” is 
not in doubt.   
 
The Islamization of Kafiristan occurred in much the same context as the subjugation of the 
Hazarajat, though in the latter case there was less requisite emphasis on conversion as such.44  
Abd al-Rahman in the Hazara case utilized Islamization as one of the political tools available to 
motivate Sunni opposition to a heterodox but still functionally Islamic Hazarajat, while in 
Kafiristan Islamization was the necessary mode by which the region could and would be brought 
 
41 A.C. Jewett, An American Engineer in Afghanistan.  Edited by Marjorie Jewett Bell.  University of Minnesota 
Press (1948), p. 75. 
42 Ibid., p. 84. 
43 Ibid., pp. 288-290. 
44 Amin Tarzi, “Islam, Shari‘a, and State Building under ‘Abd Al-Rahman Khan,” in Nile Green (ed.), Afghanistan's 
Islam:  From Conversion to the Taliban.  University of California Press, (2017), pp. 131-132, 137-138. 
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under Kabul’s thumb.  Here, again, substantial numbers of Pashtun tribesmen were settled within 
the freshly designated Nuristani people to further link the region to structures of state power and 
modify the relations of those Pashtuns themselves to the state.45  The notion of solidifying a 
common Islamic jurisprudence and Sunni mode of worship across sovereign Afghan territory 
was part and parcel of Abd al-Rahman’s two campaigns of internal imperialism seen here, but its 
utilization differed drastically.   
 
The Frontier at War 
The region of Hazara territory that was specifically the focus of resistance to state 
authority in the late 19th century, southwest Hazarajat, became characterized during this time as 
Yaghistan or “rebels’ land.”46   It was composed of the modern province of Uruzgan, as well as 
districts in Ghazni, Zabol, Qandahar, and Helmand, i.e., regions bordering major Pashtun-
dominated population centers.47  This belt of mixed dryland farms and highland pasture was 
dominated by the Hazara.  However, it was also proximate to Pashtun majorities and included 
Pashtun minorities.48   
 
Incensed by a public castigation of rebellious Hazara activities given by Abd al-Rahman, local 
conflicts in ethnically mixed Hazara/Pashtun regions boiled over into low-scale violence.  
Promising new lands and property for the Pashtun, particularly the Mohmand and Ahmadzai 
 
45 Dupree, p. 419. 
46 Ibrahimi, p. 6. 
47 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
48 Ibid., p. 6; Mousavi, pp. 129-131. 
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tribes, the Afghan king assembled an army with a claimed strength of over 100,000 fighting men 
to prosecute the war in Yaghistan.  The majority of those troops were tribal Pashtun volunteers.49   
 
Naturally, clashes between Hazara insurrectionaries and local state-backed groups emerged here 
first.50  Such clashes took the form of limited but directed violence towards local Hazara notables 
and their families.  Sayed Jafar’s arrest and subsequent exile took place in this context.  
Importantly, these first actions against Hazara leadership were not carried out just by Pashtun 
and non-Hazara state-allied groups, but by elements within the Sunni Hazara community as 
well.51  Abd al-Rahman’s “calls to violence” against the Hazara were initially religious in 
character; part and parcel of the government’s wider campaigns of Islamization that sought to 
bring out a more unitary Sunni Islamic mode of national unity among the diverse and disunited 
groups that dwelled in Afghan state territory.52  Identifying enemies of the state first by their 
religious heterodoxy encouraged infighting in communities, specifically, the Hazara who 
possessed religious divisions, but had not before acted upon them in a major way.  This intra-
Hazara conflict came to a head when a regional Pashtun government appointee fined both sides 
in the struggle, Shia and Sunni alike, a substantial sum of 100,000 rupees each as a result of the 
fighting.  Neither side was able to provide the necessary funds, and when tax collectors from 
Kabul arrived in 1890 to secure the fines, the two Hazara factions were attacked together and 
defeated by state forces.53   
 
49 Ferdinand, pp. 127-128. 
50 Ibrahimi, p. 6. 
51 Mousavi, p. 121. 
52 Kakar, p. 311. 
53 Mousavi, p. 122. 
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This incident, the first real direct conflagration between the Hazara as a whole and the forces of 
Abd al-Rahman, demonstrates the limited analytical validity of the “Shia identity” so focused 
upon by contemporary ethnographers and historians of the Hazara.  In real terms, the Shia-ness 
of the Hazara majority is not what the Afghan state chose to penalize with insurmountable 
financial burdens and state-endorsed militant action.  Rather, it was the autonomy of the 
Hazarajat itself.  The supposedly essential application of “Shia identity” upon the Hazara is not a 
natural extrusion of their lived experiences and traditional lifeways, but rather an exonomic 
imposition leveraged by the Afghan state to further developments at best orthogonal to questions 
of religious affiliation.   
 
The defeat of Hazara fighters in 1890 was not the end but rather the prelude to real violence in 
the region.  Mousavi identifies that initial conflagration as “Phase One” in the Hazarajat’s 
subjugation, followed by a Phase Two running from 1890-1893.54  The Afghan state 
progressively and consistently tightened its authority over the region by striking directly at 
traditional structures of power among the Hazara elite.  To do so, waves of mirs, begs, and 
sayyeds from the Hazarajat were summoned to Kabul by authorities, stripped of any residual 
legal power that the Afghan state structure accorded them, and consequently imprisoned or 
exiled.  In their place were positioned Pashtun administrators and accompanying detachments of 
Kabuli soldiers to collect newly increased taxes and defend against the ensuing modes of Hazara 
resistance.55  Once it was understood by local leadership that this was not a piecemeal response 
 
54 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
55 Ibid., p. 123. 
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to past insurrection but a totalizing shift in regional governance, it became a singular and vital 
imperative to act with force against the Afghan state, and resistance was immediate and 
widespread.  
 
Armed resistance in Phase Two of the war in the Hazarajat began in 1892 with an assault on a 
state garrison by Hazara forces of the Pahlawan tribe in response to a sexual assault on the wife 
of a prominent local.56  The success of that operation encouraged widespread uprisings 
throughout the region, which were soon accompanied by militant action on the part of the Kabuli 
Hazara community and even some support from Afghan state officials in the Hazarajat who were 
dissatisfied with government policy.  Critical differences between insurrection in Mousavi’s first 
and second phase was that the latter phase of rebellion had an identified leadership and specific 
national political aims, while the former had neither.57  Importantly, that leader, Mohammad 
Azim Beg, was not a self-declared Hazara nationalist or revolutionary.  Rather, he had been one 
of the first mirs to pledge the allegiance of he and his tribe to Abd al-Rahman in the 1880s, and 
subsequently helped to coordinate the Afghan state’s early moves to reinforce its authority in the 
Hazarajat.  That an individual so close to Abd al-Rahman’s structures of power would choose to 
side with a local rebellion over state authority is evidence both of the “activation” of Hazara 
identity due to outside pressure, and the severity of that pressure in itself.   
 
Mir Azim Beg organized a meeting of Hazara mirs in early 1892, which came to be known as the 
Jirga-e Au Qoal.  That conference established the explicit aim of the rebellion not as the re-
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imposition of traditional authority, autonomy, and functional independence in the Hazarajat, but 
rather the overthrow of Abd al-Rahman and his regime.58  Perhaps this is because Hazara 
leadership understood the coming war as one centered on the nature of state authority, rather than 
a defense of any sort of ethno-religious proto-identity.   
 
Aided by the relative topographic isolation of the region, rebel forces were able to secure major 
points of entry to “upper” Hazarajat and defeat initial state detachments sent to quell the 
uprising.  Yaghistan, around the southern fringes of Hazara territory, remained under state 
control.59  Here took place the major action of the war and its ensuing ethnographic 
consequences. 
 
The failings of the rebellion are numerous and not entirely within this paper’s scope, but they 
will be briefly listed for context.  Firstly, the Hazara rebels’ explicit identification of regime 
change in Kabul as their overarching motivation for prosecuting the war reaffirmed state 
propaganda that the Hazara were heretics and traitors who sought to disrupt the essential 
ordering of the nation, thus lending more support through armed volunteerism among the 
Pashtun tribes.  Secondly, there was intermittent infighting among Hazara mirs and their men 
over local revenue impositions and struggles for intra-Hazara power, hurting the capability of 
Hazara forces to cooperate in a united front.  Conversely, Afghan state forces operated under a 
unified and relatively stable structure of command that lent them the ability to more effectively 
coordinate and bring force to bear on pockets of resistance.  Lastly, just as the topography of the 
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Hazarajat isolated the region from the easy exercise of state power, it also isolated individual 
Hazara communities from each other.  Each settled locality of the Hazarajat operated 
independently as an insurrectionary enclave within relatively impassable mountains, preventing 
the Hazara from leveraging significant cooperation between rebel groups.60  All these factors 
enabled the numerically superior and better equipped state forces to triumph by late 1893, and 
secure a negotiated peace with Hazara leadership by 1894.   
 
A Broken Land 
The results of the peace in Yaghistan were dually immense and traumatic.  All positions 
of leadership and governance, once held by local Hazara authority figures, were given either to 
transplanted Pashtun appointees or local Hazara deemed loyal to Kabul and paid via central 
government salaries.  These government representatives were known as arbabs.61  Grazelands in 
the south, as well as proximate farmland, were transferred to the ownership and usage of Pashtun 
nomads who had been promised such compensation for supporting the war effort in the 
beginning stages of rebellion.62  This had the dual effect of dislocating as many as 400,000 
Hazara from their traditional lands63 while also transferring vast territories to a population who, 
in the state’s later assessment, were incapable of effectively utilizing that land.   
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Hopes that “settling” the Pashtun in southern Hazarajat quickly gave way to the realization that 
their new land grant was barely utilized, and came at the costs of a loss in regional economic 
productivity and thus state revenue.64  Recognizing the nature but possibly not the extent of their 
miscalculation, Afghan state officials gradually re-transitioned land rights for definitively arable 
territory in former Yaghistan back to their original Hazara inhabitants from 1895 into the early 
reign of Amanullah Khan, Abd al-Rahman’s grandson.65  At the same time, land identified as 
productive pasture remained in the hands of newly settled Pashtun, creating a dynamic in which 
the Pashtun nomads regularly crossed, camped within, and extracted local concessions from the 
extant Hazara farming communities.  In the end, which was not an end, but only a stage for later 
ethnic conflagrations, the Hazara emerged defeated, broken, and made subservient to the Kabuli 
state, while the state itself gained nominal control of the Hazarajat at the expense of a heightened 
potential for later violence.   
 
Conclusions 
Characterizing the war in the Hazarajat as an essentially sectarian conflict passes over the 
very tangible aspects of state development and core-periphery power relations which fed into the 
war’s inception, and which fell out of its end.  The Hazara, once an isolated and definitively 
premodern people on the “inner edge” of the Afghan state, were brought fully within it through 
antagonistic modes of internal imperialism that both begat an essentially negative and foreign 
“Hazara identity”, as well as engendered deep animosity and distrust between the Hazara and the 
Afghan state.  These modes of state building in Afghanistan’s interior, though nominally 
 
64 Mousavi, pp. 94-97, 133-137. 
65 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
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modernizing and integrationist, still operated upon paradigms of tribal politics inimical to 
constructing a viable Afghan nation-state.   
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